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Abstract
Following the 1997–98 financial turmoil, crisis countries in Asia moved toward either
floating or fixed exchange rate systems, superficially consistent with the bipolar view of
exchange rate regimes and the “hollow middle” hypothesis. But some observers have claimed
that, despite the changes in their de jure exchange rate regimes, the crisis countries’ policies have
de facto been very similar in the post- and pre-crisis periods. This paper analyzes the evidence
and concludes that, except for Malaysia, which adopted a hard peg and imposed capital controls,
the other crisis countries are floating more than before, though less than “real” floaters do. But
the intermediate exchange rate policies pursued by most of the crisis countries during the post-
crisis can be justified on second-best arguments.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
The severe financial crises experienced over the past decade by many emerging market
economies have been attributed to a variety of causes, of which an important common one is the
attempts by the crisis countries to maintain exchange rate regimes (“soft” pegs) that were no
longer viable in light of their greatly enhanced integration with international capital markets. In
the context of such enhanced integration, it has been argued, only the polar extremes of floating
exchange rates or fixed exchange rates supported by very strong commitment mechanisms
(“hard” pegs), can be sustained for extended periods. In other words, the recurrent crises of
recent years reflect the inevitable breakdown of intermediate regimes.
Among the crises of the 1990s, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 has certainly played
a key role in generating the perception of a vanishing middle ground for exchange rate regimes
in developing countries, a doctrine that has come to be known as the “hollow middle.” The
macroeconomic performance of the Asian economies that later succumbed to currency and
banking crises (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) had previously been
hailed as an economic miracle, and active management of the exchange rate in pursuit of the
competitiveness objective had often been credited with making an important contribution to their
“miraculous” macroeconomic performance. The crisis forced all of these countries to abandon
their de facto exchange rate pegs, and the subsequent floats of their currencies were associated
with very sharp fluctuations in their values. Thus, if even these economies with such exceptional
macroeconomic fundamentals proved unable to sustain a policy of active exchange rate
management in a more financially integrated world during the 1990s, prospects would appear to
be bleak for other developing countries to do so.
More recently, doubts have arisen about post-crisis exchange rate policies in the Asian
crisis countries themselves. Several observers have noted that in the wake of their crises, several
of these countries may be reverting to exchange rate practices similar to those of the pre-crisis
period, in the sense that their authorities have sought to stabilize the values of their currencies
against the U.S. dollar without adopting any of the strong commitment mechanisms that would
be called for under the doctrine of the “hollow middle.” The worry among such observers is that,
in view of the vanishing scope for ‘soft’ peg arrangements under current international financial
conditions, resuming such practices in the former crisis countries may make them vulnerable to a
repetition of the events of 1997–98.
2 The implied policy advice is that these countries themselves
should opt for one of the extreme currency arrangements that their own past experience (and that
of others) suggests as the only viable options as long as they remain highly integrated with world
capital markets.
This paper addresses two issues raised by this recent experience. Its narrower objective is
to identify and evaluate post-crisis exchange rate policy in five of the countries that suffered
most severely from the Asian financial crisis. For this purpose, we seek to determine the extent
to which these countries have indeed reverted to their pre-crisis exchange rate practices, to
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characterize the exchange rate policies they are currently pursuing, and to evaluate the
appropriateness of such policies in light of both contemporary international financial conditions
as well as of the post-crisis circumstances of those economies. The broader objective is to draw
lessons from that experience for the doctrine of the “hollow middle” for exchange rate policies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections II and III, we attempt to identify the
exchange rate regimes that have prevailed in five former crisis countries—Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand—during the post-crisis period. To eliminate the period
of most severe instability associated with the crisis, we define the post-crisis as 1999–2001.
3
Having characterized the exchange rate regimes, we turn in Section IV to a consideration of the
possible objectives that may have been driving the formulation of post-crisis exchange rate
policies in the former crisis countries. Our next task, undertaken in Section V, is to evaluate the
objectives and conduct of exchange rate policy in light of the post-crisis circumstances faced by
these five economies. Section VI takes up some considerations that can be expected to influence
longer-term exchange rate policies in these economies. In our concluding section we summarize
our findings and attempt to draw lessons from the post-crisis experience of the Asian crisis
countries for exchange rate management in other developing countries.
II.   POST-CRISIS EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES IN THE ASIAN CRISIS COUNTRIES: DE JURE
In evaluating the post-crisis exchange rate policies of the Asian crisis countries, the first
issue we face is identifying the exchange rate policies that each of these countries pursued during
the post-crisis period. In this section and the next, we address this basic question. Our main
concerns are two: first, to identify how exchange rate policy has changed in each of these
countries from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period; second, to place their post-crisis exchange
rate policies in an international context. In other words, given a continuum from hard pegs to
cleanly floating exchange rates, we want to identify the direction in which each of these
countries has moved along this continuum as well as where they stand on this scale in their post-
crisis conduct of exchange rate policies.
The official IMF classifications of exchange rate regimes for our five countries before
and after the Asian financial crisis are reported in Table 1. According to this classification,  at
least three of the five countries in our group (Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand) underwent a
transformation in their officially-declared exchange rate regimes in the direction of greater
flexibility as a result of the crisis, while one—Malaysia—moved in the opposite direction. Only
the Philippines retained its pre-crisis exchange regime classification.
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Table 1: Official Exchange Rate Regimes in the Asian Crisis Countries
Indonesia November 1978–June 1997 Managed Floating
July 1997–December 2001 Independently Floating
Korea March 1980–October 1997 Managed Floating
November 1997–December 2001 Independently Floating
Malaysia January 1986–February 1990 Limited Flexibility
March 1990–November 1992 Fixed
December 1992–September 1998 Managed Floating
September 1998–December 2001 Pegged Arrangement
Philippines January 1988–December 2001 Independently Floating
Thailand January 1970–June 1997 Fixed
July 1997–December 2001 Independently Floating
Source: IMF, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, several issues.
But there are at least two reasons to question whether these official classifications
adequately capture how exchange rate policy has evolved in these countries from the pre- to the
post-crisis period.
First, with the exception of Thailand, which described itself as pegged to an undisclosed
currency basket, none of these countries maintained an exchange rate regime officially classified
as “fixed” prior to the crisis. The classification of the remaining pre-crisis regimes as “floating”
in some fashion seems to run counter to the conventional wisdom about the role of exchange rate
pegs in determining vulnerability to crisis. To the extent that these countries were defending an
exchange rate peg prior to the crisis, therefore, their actions were at odds with their officially
declared exchange rate regimes.
Second, there has been a growing perception among knowledgeable observers that little
may have changed with respect to exchange rate policy in these countries after the crisis. Calvo
and Reinhart (2000a), for example, conclude about the crisis countries: “Indeed, once financial
markets settled and capital flowed back into Asia, their currencies are fluctuating much the way
they did prior to the crisis —that is to say, they are not fluctuating at all.” (p. 27). Similarly,
McKinnon (2000), states: “In the year 2000, both the crisis and non-crisis countries of East Asia
(with Japan remaining the important exception) have returned to formal or informal dollar
pegging, which is statistically indistinguishable from what they were doing before the crisis.” (p.
9).
The difference between the de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes in the crisis
countries before the crisis,
4 together with the conclusions drawn by knowledgeable observers
about actual post-crisis exchange rate policies in these countries, raise the possibility that the gap
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between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes that existed in the Asian crisis countries
before the crisis may have reasserted itself after the crisis. The identification of post-crisis
exchange rate policies in these countries is thus an empirical issue.
III.   IDENTIFYING EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES DE FACTO
The acknowledged gap between de jure and de facto exchange rate policies in many
countries has recently given rise to a new literature identifying how exchange rate policies have
actually been conducted in emerging markets, based on observed outcomes for exchange rates,
foreign exchange reserves, and domestic interest rates. Of course, the polar opposite cases of
bilateral pegs with very narrow bands, on the one hand, and clean floats, on the other, are in
principle easy to identify. A fixed bilateral peg would exhibit no exchange rate variation outside
a very narrow band (conventionally taken as +/- 2.25 percent), while a clean float would exhibit
no foreign-exchange market intervention—i.e., no variation in an appropriately-measured stock
of foreign exchange reserves.
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Beyond these extreme exchange rate arrangements, what is of interest is the degree of
commitment to a “soft peg.” The preceding observation suggests that it may be possible to assess
this degree of commitment on the basis of the observed volatilities of financial variables such as
exchange rates and stocks of foreign exchange reserves. This degree of commitment could then
be gauged on the basis of cross-country comparisons of such volatilities, or by comparisons of
the behavior of such variables in the same country over different periods of time.
A.   Exchange Rate Volatility
Figure 1 shows the bilateral exchange rate against the U.S. dollar for the five countries in
our group, both before and after the crisis. It is evident that Malaysia and Indonesia are outliers
in our sample. Malaysia has announced and implemented a fixed exchange rate in the post-crisis
period, while the exchange rate for the Indonesia rupiah has quite clearly been significantly more
variable in the post- than in the pre-crisis period.
6 For the other countries the visual evidence
suggests more variability post-crisis, but is not so clear-cut.
                                                
5 An appropriately measured stock of foreign reserves should correct for the ‘natural’ or exogenous rate
of change in reserves caused by interest earnings and valuation changes; only the remaining change in
reserves (due to market intervention) captures the volatility that we are interested in.
6 For a definition of the pre- and post-crisis periods see footnote 3.5






















































































































































































Note: the figure shows the LN of nominal exchange rate indices (January 1990 =100). A fall
is a depreciation and a rise an appreciation. Source: IMF.
In Table 2, we complement this graphical evidence with some statistical measures of
exchange rate volatility: the range of variation in monthly percentage exchange rate changes as
well as their standard deviation. Notice from the table that in the pre-crisis period, all five of the
Asian crisis countries had much more stable exchange rates than the “clean” floaters (the U.S.,
Germany, and Japan), as well as Mexico, which floated its exchange rate six months after the
inception of the period we have labeled “pre-crisis.” Indeed, the bilateral exchange rate against
the U.S. dollar during the pre-crisis period for these five countries was more stable than that of
Chile, which explicitly maintained an exchange rate band during this period. These results are
consistent with the conventional wisdom that, despite the official designations of their exchange
rate regimes prior to the crisis, all five of these countries actively defended an exchange rate peg.
The table confirms the sharp modifications that have taken place between the pre- and
post-crisis periods in the behavior of the exchange rate in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Indeed,
Indonesia’s bilateral exchange rate against the U.S. dollar has been much more volatile than the
bilateral rates among “clean” floaters such as the United States, Germany (the Euro during the
post-crisis) and Japan. With respect to the other countries, it is obvious from the table that the
volatility of monthly exchange rate changes has indeed increased after the crisis in all of them,
though in the cases of Korea and the Philippines, which exhibited the greatest degree of
exchange rate variability before the crisis, the change is not as pronounced as for Thailand. The6
post-crisis volatility in these currencies has been comparable to that between the U.S. dollar and
the Euro or the Yen, as well as to that of Chile and Mexico, both of which officially floated their
currencies during this period.
7 This evidence suggests that there has indeed been a fundamental
change in the exchange rate policies of the Asian countries pre- and post-crisis.
Table 2. :  Monthly Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility in Five Asian Crisis Countries
Period Range Standard Deviation
U.S. $/DM Pre-crisis 0.115 0.026
Post-crisis 0.118 0.028
U.S.$/Yen Pre-crisis 0.203 0.036
Post-crisis 0.119 0.030
Chile Pre-crisis 0.091 0.017
Post-crisis 0.170 0.033
Mexico Pre-crisis 0.695 0.101
Post-crisis 0.109 0.025
Indonesia Pre-crisis 0.017 0.003
Post-crisis 0.300 0.076
Korea Pre-crisis 0.057 0.011
Post-crisis 0.100 0.026
Malaysia Pre-crisis 0.043 0.009
Post-crisis 0.000 0.000
Philippines Pre-crisis 0.089 0.015
Post-crisis 0.155 0.028
Thailand Pre-crisis 0.025 0.005
Post-crisis 0.126 0.025
Source: Authors’ calculations.
B.   Foreign Exchange Reserve Volatility
A second indicator of exchange rate policy is the volatility in a country’s foreign
exchange reserves. Intervention in the foreign exchange market involves changes in the stocks of
foreign reserves held by central banks, so we might expect countries that intervene less, allowing
the market exchange rate to absorb the effects of shocks, to have more stable reserve stocks than
those that intervene more often to stabilize the exchange rate. Table 3 shows two measures of
reserve volatility for the same countries listed in Table 2. The measures are the mean absolute
monthly percentage change in reserves, and the standard deviation of monthly reserve percentage
changes. As one might expect, in the pre-crisis period, the known “clean” floaters in the group
(Germany and Japan) exhibited the smallest average monthly changes in reserves. By contrast,
mean absolute reserve changes were larger for all the developing countries in the table, including
our five Asian crisis countries. Consistent with the results on exchange rate volatility, this
suggests that, relative to the “clean” floaters, these countries permitted much less flexibility to
their exchange rates during the pre-crisis period. The conclusions are similar when reserve
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crisis of December 1994. See the results in Table 6.7
volatility is measured as the standard deviation of monthly reserve changes (column 4 in the
table).
Table 3: Monthly Reserve Volatility in Five Asian Crisis Countries
Period Mean Absolute Change Standard deviation
Germany Pre-crisis 1.279 1.762
Post-crisis 2.939 4.081
Japan Pre-crisis 1.904 2.930
Post-crisis 1.872 2.707
Chile Pre-crisis 2.437 2.924
Post-crisis 1.755 2.613
Mexico Pre-crisis 13.45 25.09
Post-crisis 2.267 3.192
Indonesia Pre-crisis 2.195 2.922
Post-crisis 1.938 2.846
Korea Pre-crisis 3.047 3.645
Post-crisis 2.101 1.889
Malaysia Pre-crisis 2.351 3.530
Post-crisis 2.655 3.245
Philippines Pre-crisis 3.821 4.741
Post-crisis 3.076 3.983
Thailand Pre-crisis 1.967 2.875
Post-crisis 1.377 1.996
   Source: Authors’ calculations.
Turning to the post-crisis period, among the Asian crisis countries reserve volatility
decreased noticeably in Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, and slightly in Indonesia, but
increased in Malaysia. These results are consistent with the adoption of more flexible exchange
rate arrangements in the first four countries, though reserve volatility remained much higher
during the post-crisis period in the Philippines than in the “clean” floaters.  The clear suggestion
is that the assumption of a uniform volatility of shocks, both across countries and over time, is
likely to have been violated in the case of the Philippines.
8 The results are also consistent with
reduced exchange rate flexibility in Malaysia, which also exhibited greater reserve volatility than
either of the comparator developing countries outside of Asia.
C.   Interest Rate Volatility
Our final indicator of exchange rate policy in this section will rely on the volatility of
interest rates. Under our implicit assumptions that shocks are uniform across countries and over
time, and that shocks arise from credibility effects, countries may seek to stabilize their exchange
rates by intervening in domestic securities markets rather than by buying or selling reserves. In
that case, greater exchange rate flexibility would be associated with smaller domestic interest
rate volatility.
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In Table 4, we measure interest rate volatility by examining the range of nominal interest
rates, the mean absolute monthly change in interest rates, and the standard deviation of monthly
interest rate changes. The patterns in the data can be summarized as follows:
(i) In the cases of Korea and Thailand, monthly interest rate volatility decreased in the post-
crisis relative to the pre-crisis period by all of our measures. As with the previous
indicators, this result is consistent with a decreased commitment to exchange rate
stability during the post-crisis period in both of these countries.  Moreover, Korea’s
interest rate volatility was lower than that of the two developing comparator countries
and comparable to that of Germany, though somewhat higher than that of Japan.  By this
measure, Thailand’s relative commitment to floating does not appear as strong as that of
Korea in the post-crisis period, since its interest rate volatility, while smaller than that of
Chile and Mexico, exceeded that of both Germany and Japan.
(ii) As we have seen previously, Malaysia adopted a fixed exchange rate in September 1998.
Under our provisional assumption of uniform credibility shocks across countries, this
would suggest that in defending this rate, Malaysia should have experienced an increase
in interest rate volatility relative to the pre-crisis period, when the country allowed more
flexibility in its exchange rate. This is the opposite of what we find in Table 4. A natural
explanation, of course, is that Malaysia’s capital controls may have dampened the effects
of confidence shocks in the foreign exchange market. If so, this should also have been
associated with reduced volatility of international reserves.  However, the evidence on
this score in Table 3 was inconclusive, suggesting the complementary explanation that
reduced interest rate volatility may also have arisen in part from defense of the exchange
rate through sterilized—rather than non-sterilized—intervention in the foreign exchange
market.
9
(iii) Finally, interest rate volatility increased in the post-crisis period for both Indonesia and
the Philippines, by all three of our measures. Recall that in Indonesia exchange rate
volatility increased sharply (and reserve volatility decreased slightly) in the post-crisis,
while in the Philippines exchange rate volatility increased and reserve volatility, while
somewhat reduced compared to the pre-crisis period, remained high by international
standards. The strong suggestion is that for these two countries, what we have dubbed the
“post-crisis” period has not been a tranquil one in the foreign exchange market—that is,
that our assumption of uniform shocks across countries and periods is not tenable in the
case of Indonesia and the Philippines.
                                                
9 This reflected the intent of policies introduced in September 1998 to mitigate the effect of the crisis on
the corporate sector. Given that Malaysia’s corporate sector relied more heavily in domestic than
external borrowing, policies were aimed at introducing a more stable interest rate structure and
bringing domestic interest rates down. This interpretation does not deny that the overall policy
approach adopted in September 1998—featuring a fixed exchange rate, selective capital controls, a
fiscal stimulus package and fundamental reforms in the financial and corporate sectors—contributed to
reduced uncertainty (see the results and discussion in section III.D below).9
Table 4: Monthly Interest Rate Volatility in Five Asian Crisis Countries
Period Range Mean Absolute Change Standard Deviation
Germany Pre-crisis 0.590 0.087 0.114
Post-crisis 0.950 0.157 0.213
Japan Pre-crisis 0.723 0.063 0.137
Post-crisis 0.276 0.021 0.046
Chile Pre-crisis 12.163 2.315 3.125
Post-crisis 11.509 1.800 2.446
México Pre-crisis 68.950 6.106 10.245
Post-crisis 6.995 1.365 1.614
Indonesia Pre-crisis 4.970 0.831 1.146
Post-crisis 19.540 1.926 3.444
Korea Pre-crisis 6.200 1.032 1.357
Post-crisis 0.930 0.122 0.205
Malaysia Pre-crisis 5.760 0.387 0.760
Post-crisis 1.870 0.114 0.300
Philippines Pre-crisis 3.832 0.715 0.893
Post-crisis 7.628 0.903 1.328
Thailand Pre-crisis 11.944 1.996 2.472
Post-crisis 1.450 0.280 0.355
  Source: Authors’ calculations.
D.   Severity of Shocks
To examine whether this may have been the case, we have computed an index of monthly
changes in “exchange market pressure” for each of our five countries. This index, due to Girton
and Roper (1977), is a weighted average of monthly changes in the exchange rate (in percent), in
the stock of international reserves (in percent), and in domestic interest rates.
10 The absolute
monthly changes in the index can help determine whether the post-crisis period was more
volatile than the pre-crisis one.
11 Table 5 below shows the number of observations that exceeded
a certain threshold (2 percent) during both periods.
12 These results suggest that the post-crisis
period may have been more volatile than the pre-crisis one for the Philippines and Indonesia.
                                                
10 The weights are inversely proportional to the relative variances of the three individual indicators of
exchange market pressure, so that each component contributes the same amount of volatility to the
index.
11 Actually, we calculate a weighted average of the absolute changes in each of the series that compound
the index. We do this because the movements in the series can compensate with each other, not
properly reflecting the size of the shocks.
12 The threshold resulted from looking at a plot of the absolute monthly changes in the indices during
both periods. We present the table here for simplicity since the corresponding charts are more difficult
to interpret.10
Table 5: Exchange Market Volatility in the Asian Crisis Countries







  Source: Authors’ calculations.
Accordingly, to correct for the possibility that changes in volatilities in the previous
section could just reflect the violation of one of our assumptions—i.e., that shocks have been
uniformly severe across countries and periods—we look at the relative volatility of the exchange
rate compared to those of reserves and interest rates in each of our countries. Because this
provides a crude measure of the relative extent to which foreign exchange market shocks have
been absorbed by the exchange rate instead of by changes in reserves or in domestic interest
rates, it is in principle independent of the volatility of the environment. The results of these
comparisons are reported in Table 6.
The results are consistent with our previous findings for Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand.
As in the earlier results, Korea and Thailand appear clearly to be floating more actively after the
crisis than before, in the sense that in the post-crisis period shocks tend to be reflected to a
greater extent in exchange rate movements rather than in movements in reserves or domestic
interest rates. Since the exchange rate has been fixed during the post-crisis period in Malaysia,
the results are trivially consistent with our previous ones as well.
For the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines, we had previously attributed across-the-
board increases in volatility to a less stable environment in the post-crisis period. Correcting for
this effect by using the relative volatility measure, we find that these countries also tended to
allow greater scope for exchange rate responses to shocks after the crisis than before. In both
countries the volatility of the exchange rate relative to that of both interest rates and reserves
increased sharply in the post-crisis period. It is worth noting, however, that in all four of the
Asian countries that apparently moved to more flexible exchange rates after the crisis, the
relative volatility of the exchange rate compared to domestic interest rates was less than that of
the “pure floaters.”  Except for Indonesia, these countries also tended to have relatively greater
reserve volatility than Germany, though somewhat less than Japan.
13
                                                
13 In the case of Japan, the relatively high measured reserve volatility was due to a few large spikes—
presumably associated with isolated episodes of intervention by the Japanese central bank that turned
out to be relatively large in the context of a small reserve stock.11
Table 6: Volatility Ratios in Five Asian Crisis Countries
Exchange rate changes relative
to interest rate changes
Exchange rate changes
relative to reserve changes
Germany Pre-crisis 22.89 1.43
Post-crisis 13.66 1.89
Japan Pre-crisis 26.34 1.15
Post-crisis 63.84 0.95
Chile Pre-crisis 0.55 0.59
Post-crisis 1.35 1.04
Mexico Pre-crisis 0.98 0.39
Post-crisis 1.57 0.85
Indonesia Pre-crisis 0.26 0.10
Post-crisis 2.21 2.20
Korea Pre-crisis 0.84 0.31
Post-crisis 12.44 1.40
Malaysia Pre-crisis 1.17 0.25
Post-crisis 0.00 0.00
Philippines Pre-crisis 1.68 0.31
Post-crisis 2.10 0.64
Thailand Pre-crisis 0.19 0.16
Post-crisis 7.08 1.10
   Source: Authors’ calculations
E.   Summary
In short, our results so far suggest that our Asian crisis countries can be divided into three
groups:
i. For Korea and Thailand, the post-crisis period was a relatively tranquil one. These countries
moved to substantially greater exchange rate flexibility in the post-crisis period, though both
of them appear to have attempted to influence their bilateral exchange rates against the U.S.
dollar to a greater extent than have industrial-country “pure floaters.” This is especially the
case for Thailand.
14  These countries have thus moved in the direction of more flexible rates,
but have not moved to the extreme pole of pure (clean) floating.
ii. Malaysia has quite openly fixed its bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate since September 1998,
and has defended this parity primarily through sterilized foreign exchange market
intervention rather than by assigning the task of stabilizing the exchange rate to monetary
policy. This approach to exchange rate policy may have been facilitated by the country’s
                                                
14 It should be noted that the conclusions regarding Korea are much stronger if, as done in the previous
version of this paper, the pre- and post-crisis are defined as the 24-month period spanning before June
1997 and after January 1999, respectively. Also, the analysis in section IV below suggests that Korea
does not classify as a “pure” floater.12
imposition of restrictions on capital movements but also by the improved regional economic
conditions after the September 1998 measures were introduced.
15
iii. For Indonesia and the Philippines, the post-crisis period has proved to be more turbulent in
foreign exchange markets than the pre-crisis one. These countries have responded by
allowing the exchange rate to move, by intervening in foreign exchange markets, as well as
by using domestic monetary policies to defend the value of the exchange rate. However, the
relative weight placed on exchange rate movements as endogenous responses to shocks
increased greatly in the post-crisis period, implying that these countries, like Korea and
Thailand, have also moved toward more flexible exchange rate regimes. However, like Korea
and Thailand as well, they have targeted the exchange rate to an extent that appears to be
somewhat greater than that practiced in the industrial-country “pure floaters.”
In short, contrary to the views of some observers (i.e., McKinnon), there has indeed been
a change in de facto exchange rate regimes in all five of these countries between the pre- and
post-crisis periods. While none of them have adopted “soft pegs” with unfettered capital
movements, neither have they moved to the extreme corner solutions of “hard” pegs or clean
floats. In other words, all of them have continued to manage their exchange rates in an active
manner, and have thus occupied the supposed “hollow middle” of exchange rate policy.
16
IV.   OBJECTIVES OF POST-CRISIS EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
The basic conclusion of the previous section is that, with the exception of Malaysia, the
Asian crisis countries have moved toward allowing greater floating of their exchange rates
during the post-crisis period. However, they do not float to the same extent as do the “pure
floaters” among industrial countries, as there is evidence that these countries have both
intervened in foreign exchange markets as well as adapted domestic monetary policies to
influence their exchange rates.
17 The question that we address in this section is why these
countries have adopted such practices—i.e., what have been the objectives of post-crisis
exchange rate policy in the Asian crisis countries? Our approach will be to consider a variety of
possible rationales for the authorities’ behavior and examine whether each of them is consistent
with the evidence.
A.   Reduce Volatility
A possible reason for “dirty” floating on the part of four of our economies is to stabilize
high-frequency exchange rate movements. Indeed, one can argue that exchange rate smoothing
may be an appropriate response in the post-crisis period from a Bayesian perspective. Because of
the large exchange rate movements that were associated with the crisis (see Figure 1), economic
agents may have only weak prior beliefs about the equilibrium level of the nominal (and thus
                                                
15 It should be noted that as economic situations weakened in Malaysia and the region since late 2000,
the ringgit has come under more pressure. See figure 2.
16 Annex I provides an in-depth analysis of why our results differ from those of McKinnon.
17 Korea appears as the closest to the “pure” floater case. See footnote 14.13
real) exchange rate in these economies in the immediate post-crisis period. Under these
circumstances, their exchange rate expectations and market spot rates may be excessively
sensitive to market developments and news. In other words, under these conditions
“extrapolative” expectations may be more likely to emerge and episodes of overshooting to
occur. In the absence of an explicit commitment on the part of the authorities to defend a specific
parity, intervention to smooth out high-frequency exchange rate movements may thus help to
anchor agents’ expectations about the path of the real and nominal exchange rates by removing
much of the “noise” from the exchange rate series. This means allowing the nominal bilateral
rate to move to its equilibrium level, and intervening only to prevent excessive (stationary)
volatility around that level.
If foreign exchange market intervention were solely intended to smooth out high-
frequency exchange rate fluctuations, then central banks would be obliged to maintain a stock of
foreign exchange reserves to facilitate intervention. The stock of reserves should fluctuate
randomly around the level that is judged sufficient for the central bank to retain the option to
intervene in the foreign exchange market at its discretion, and it should not exhibit a systematic
tendency to increase or decrease over time. Thus, one way to assess whether intervention has
been designed only to smooth high-frequency exchange rate fluctuations is to examine the
behavior of the stock of reserves over time.
Figure 2 shows the pattern of reserve holding over time in the five crisis countries. All of
the countries reached lows in officially recorded reserves within a few months of allowing their
exchange rate systems to change, and subsequently they all undertook a substantial accumulation
of reserves. Compared to their minimum levels, at their maximum values reserve stocks
increased by 70 percent in Malaysia, doubled in Indonesia and the Philippines, and increased
more than five times in Korea. While reserve accumulation seems milder in Thailand (their
maximum value exceeded their minimum one by just 40 percent), when the unwinding of the
central bank’s forward position in dollars is taken into account, the rate of reserve accumulation
in that country may be at least as large as any of the others.
18, 19
The upshot is that post-crisis foreign exchange market intervention in the five crisis
countries was not what one might expect, either from a clean float or from a “dirty” float, if
intervention is designed only to smooth out high-frequency exchange rate fluctuations. If these
countries were smoothing the exchange rate, they were also systematically affecting its level
through cumulative purchases of foreign exchange, at least into the year 2000.
                                                
18 The imperfection of our reserves measure should be noted. In particular, it does not take into account
central bank obligations in forward markets. As is now well known, Thailand defended the baht during
the year prior to the float largely by intervening in forward markets, thereby incurring future dollar
liabilities that have not been netted out from the officially reported reserves that we use here.
19 The implicit monthly growth rate –between the minimum and maximum level– of reserves during the
post-crisis period are 2.4 percent for Indonesia, 3.3 percent for Korea, 2.7 percent for Malaysia, 1.5
percent for the Philippines, and 1.2 percent for Thailand.14
B.   Stabilization of the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
We have already seen that, except for Malaysia after September 1998, the Asian crisis
countries have not chosen to stabilize their bilateral exchange rates against the U.S. dollar.
However, we have also seen that the exchange values of their currencies have not been a matter
of indifference to these countries; that is, they have not been “clean” floaters. To this we have
now added that intervention has not simply been designed to smooth out exchange rate
fluctuations.
Figure 2: Post-Crisis Reserve Accumulation in the Five Crisis Countries
















































































































































What, then, has been the objective of intervention? One possibility is that these countries
may have been seeking to stabilize the path of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER).
20 In
other words, they may have been pegging to a currency basket. One can imagine at least two
reasons why they might choose to do so:
•  First, stabilizing the NEER might represent an attempt to use the exchange rate as a nominal
anchor after the crisis. Given that trade with the United States has been decreasing over time
as a share of the total trade of the crisis countries, that their other trading partners have been
characterized by low and stable inflation rates, and that the value of the U.S. dollar has at
                                                
20 Note that maintaining stability in the NEER could be compatible with a fluctuating exchange rate
against the U.S. dollar, with variability in both reserves and domestic interest rates, and even with
substantial reserve accumulation over short periods of times. All of these have been characteristic of
our economies.15
times fluctuated sharply against the currencies of their other trading partners, using the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor would suggest that the appropriate variable to stabilize
would be the NEER.
•  Second, to the extent that the crisis in each of these countries was in part triggered by
exchange rate overvaluation, many analysts have attributed this overvaluation to an
excessively rigid pre-crisis peg against the U.S. dollar at a time when the dollar was
appreciating relative to the Japanese yen. Thus, one lesson that these countries could have
drawn from the crisis would have been that, to the extent that they wish to stabilize some
version of their nominal exchange rates, the appropriate version should be one that gives
greater weight to the currencies of their other trading partners. This suggests a shift from
stabilizing the bilateral rate against the U.S. dollar toward stabilizing something like the
NEER.
How can we tell if this has been the objective driving the post-crisis exchange rate policy
in our countries? The log of a country’s NEER can be expressed as the sum of (the log of) that
country’s bilateral exchange rate against the U.S. dollar (EXCH), and (the log of) a weighted
average of the dollar value of the currencies of the home country’s main trading partners, with
weights given by the home country’s trade weights (DOLLAR). If the bilateral exchange rates
against the U.S. dollar were being managed to offset fluctuations in the dollar value of the major
trading partners’ currencies, we would expect the correlation between EXCH and DOLLAR to
approach negative one, and those between NEER and both EXCH and DOLLAR to be zero.
As Table 7 shows, this has clearly not been the case. In Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines,
and Thailand, movements in the bilateral exchange rate against the U.S. dollar have actually
been positively correlated with changes in the external value of the U.S. dollar —i.e., changes in
the bilateral exchange rates against the U.S. dollar have tended to reinforce the effects on each
country’s NEER of fluctuations in the external value of the U.S. dollar (Column 2). Moreover, in
none of our five countries has the NEER been simultaneously uncorrelated with movements in
bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rates and the external value of the dollar (Columns 3 and 4), as
would tend to be the case under a policy of NEER stabilization. Thus, in none of them does the
evidence suggest that the bilateral exchange rate against the U.S. dollar has been managed so as
to stabilize the nominal effective exchange rate after the crisis.
Table 7:  Bivariate Correlations Among Nominal Exchange Rates in Five Asian Countries
Correlation between EXCH and DOLLAR Correlation of NEER with:
EXCH DOLLAR
Indonesia 0.83* 0.98* 0.71*
Korea 0.69* 0.81* 0.14
Malaysia -0.05 0.04 -1.00*
Philippines 0.91* 0.99* 0.83*
Thailand 0.88* 0.92* 0.62*
* sig. at standard levels.
Source: Authors’ calculations16
C.   Stabilization of the Real Effective Exchange Rate
Countries may care about the behavior of their nominal exchange rates not just because
of the potential role of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, but also because, at least in the
short run, the behavior of the nominal exchange rate will influence that of the real exchange rate,
which is a key macroeconomic relative price guiding the composition of production and
absorption between traded and non-traded goods. Indeed, in the outward-oriented development
strategies that all of these formerly “miracle” economies followed up to the time of the crisis, the
behavior of the real exchange rate played an important role, as the avoidance of overvalued real
exchange rates (as observed in some Latin American countries) and the achieving of a stable and
predictable path of the real exchange rate were central components of that strategy.
Accordingly, it would not be surprising for post-crisis exchange rate policies in these
countries to revert to a concern with the behavior of the real exchange rate, and in particular for
it to be the case that, in the wake of the turbulence created in exchange markets by the crisis
itself, the authorities in these countries would find it desirable to intervene in support of real
exchange rate stability.
Have they indeed done so?
21 Just as in the case of the NEER, the real effective exchange
rate (REER) can be decomposed into two constituent series: the nominal effective exchange rate
(NEER) and the ratio between domestic and weighted trade-partner-country price levels (REL).
Has the variability in the NEER played the role of offsetting variability in relative prices? As in
the previous section, if it had, we would expect NEER and REL to be negatively correlated, and
REER to be uncorrelated both with NEER as well as with REL. These correlations are presented
in Table 8. Negative and statistically significant correlation coefficients are evident for all of the
crisis countries, but the hypothesis that this coefficient is minus one fails to be rejected only in
the case of the Philippines. However, even in that case, NEER turns out to be substantially more
volatile than REL. The result is that REER is highly and significantly correlated with NEER in
every case, and with REL as well in the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In
short, there is no evidence here that stabilization of the real effective exchange rate has been the
guiding principle of post-crisis exchange rate policy in any of our five countries.
D.   Smoothing the Pace of Depreciation
If exchange rate policy was not used to offset the effects of changes in the external value
of the U.S. dollar on each country’s NEER, or the effects of changes in relative price levels on
each country’s REER, then what was it used for? One possibility is that it may have been
                                                
21 Notice that our previous finding that stabilizing the nominal effective exchange rate has not been an
obvious concern of policy does not preclude this possibility, since nominal effective exchange rate
variability may be required to stabilize the real effective exchange rate when the domestic price level
becomes unstable relative to those of the country’s trading partners.17
intended to influence the “central tendencies” of the NEER and REER—i.e., the paths around
which the NEER and REER have fluctuated on a monthly basis.
Table 8: Bivariate Correlations Among the Real Exchange
Rate and its Components in Five Asian Countries
Correlation between NEER and REL       Correlation of REER with:
NEER REL
Indonesia -0.71* 0.88* -0.30*
Korea -0.28* 0.92* 0.12
Malaysia -0.43* 1.00* -0.35*
Philippines -0.94* 0.99* -0.89*
Thailand -0.32* 1.00* -0.24
 Source: Authors’ calculations
We saw in Table 8 that the real effective exchange rate has been very strongly correlated
with the nominal effective exchange rate during the post-crisis period in all of our countries.
Moreover, except for Malaysia, the nominal effective exchange rate has been highly correlated
with the bilateral exchange rate against the U.S. dollar. This suggests that movements in the real
effective exchange rate in these countries after the crisis have been driven by changes in their
bilateral exchange rates against the U.S. dollar, and this turns out to be the case.
22 The strong
links between the REER and bilateral exchange rates in the four floating-rate countries raises the
possibility that exchange market intervention may have been intended to influence the path of the
real effective exchange rate.
In what direction might these countries have wished to see the REER move? A logical
ex-ante possibility is that they may have wanted to smooth the pace of depreciation. We know
that the crisis was associated with extreme exchange rate depreciations in all of these countries,
and that these depreciations had cataclysmic real consequences because of the severe currency
mismatches that characterized the balance sheets of financial institutions and firms. Moreover,
we also know that, in consequence, supporting the values of these currencies was an important
objective of macroeconomic policy during the crisis in all of these countries. It is reasonable,
then, to suppose that exchange rate policy in the post-crisis period may have been directed to the
same end.
However, this logical supposition is not supported by the facts. In particular, if exchange
rate policy had been aimed at smoothing the pace of depreciation during the post-crisis period,
we would have expected the central banks of the former crisis countries to have expended
reserves in sustaining the values of their currencies. But as we have seen, just the opposite has
been true.
                                                
22 Correlations between the REER and the bilateral exchange rate against the U.S. dollar were 0.80 for
Indonesia, 0.54 for Korea, 0.05 for Malaysia, 0.96 for the Philippines, and 0.91 for Thailand, all of
them statistically significant except for Malaysia.18
E.   Smoothing the Pace of Appreciation
The accumulation of reserves by the former crisis countries suggests that, to the extent
that foreign exchange intervention was conducted with a view to influencing the path of the real
effective exchange rate, the intended result may have been exactly the opposite one, that is, these
countries may have wanted to smooth the pace of appreciation. If the crisis-induced collapse of
their currencies caused their nominal exchange rates to overshoot their equilibrium values, then
these currencies would have had a tendency to appreciate in real effective terms during the post-
crisis period, to something like their pre-crisis levels or to levels that are only moderately
depreciated compared to the pre-crisis levels, depending on whether these currencies tended to
be overvalued before the crisis. Intervention would then be intended to resist this appreciation,
either by maintaining real effective exchange rates at levels below their equilibrium values or by
slowing the rate of return of the real exchange rate to its equilibrium value. An exchange rate
policy of this type would be consistent with the substantial accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves during the post-crisis period that we documented earlier in this section.
Why might this be a reasonable objective of policy? First, as we have already indicated, a
competitive real exchange rate had long been a linchpin of development policy in these outward-
oriented economies.
23 Second, the crisis had very severe real effects in these economies, as each
of the crisis countries underwent a sharp contraction in real GDP. The maintenance of relatively
depreciated real exchange rates would thus also have played a stabilization role by encouraging
exports and discouraging imports, thereby helping to stimulate aggregate demand and foster an
economic recovery. A similar strategy was followed by Chile after its “twin crises” in the early
eighties, as well as by Mexico in the aftermath of its 1994–95 crisis. On the basis of the available
evidence, we cannot reject this interpretation of the objectives of post-crisis exchange rate policy
among the Asian crisis countries.
F.   Accumulation of a Reserve “War Chest”
Nonetheless, smoothing the pace of appreciation does not represent the only feasible
interpretation of the objectives of exchange rate policy in these countries. An alternative
interpretation is that the post-crisis moderation of real exchange rate appreciation, rather than
representing the ultimate objective of policy, was simply the byproduct of policies undertaken
with another purpose in mind, in particular, the accumulation of  a “war chest” of international
reserves.
At this point, the jury is still out on whether the Asian financial crisis is best interpreted
as a solvency or a liquidity crisis. The inability of crisis countries to raise funds on private capital
markets is consistent with either interpretation. This inability to raise funds, however, meant that
                                                
23 The concern with competitiveness has been evident throughout the region, as even non-crisis countries
such as Singapore and Taiwan floated their currencies in response to the sharp depreciations
undergone by the currencies of the crisis countries, with an eye to preserving their competitive
positions in export markets.19
the liquid resources available to each of these countries for the purpose of conducting foreign
exchange market intervention were limited to their stocks of usable foreign exchange reserves.
Countries in the region that avoided the worst effects of the crisis had in common either a limited
degree of integration with international capital markets (China, India, Vietnam), or truly massive
foreign exchange reserves (China, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China). Indeed, even Hong
Kong SAR, which did not escape a severe attack on its currency in October of 1997, was able to
successfully weather that attack partly as a result of its truly enormous stock of foreign exchange
reserves.
24 Figure 3 shows that reserve stocks among the crisis countries were indeed
substantially lower than among several countries that weathered the crisis more successfully.
25
Thus, the desire to accumulate reserves so as to secure a liquidity buffer against future
shocks provides an alternative explanation of exchange rate policy in the post-crisis countries.
Because reserve accumulation tends to sustain a depreciated value of the currency relative to
what would have happened otherwise, while the desire to resist currency appreciation implies
foreign exchange market intervention in the form of reserve accumulation, we cannot distinguish
between these possible motivations on the basis of the observation that these countries have been
engaged in substantial reserve accumulation. However, we have some direct evidence that
reserve accumulation was an explicit objective of policy, rather than simply a byproduct of an
attempt to moderate the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate. The Korean Letter of
Intent of November 1999, for example, stipulated an exchange rate policy consisting of
“smoothing operations consistent with a further buildup of usable reserves,” and a reserve floor
was established as part of the Korean program which envisioned a buildup of reserves over time.
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24 Hong Kong SAR also operated a currency board system which may have greatly enhanced the
credibility of its commitment to defend the parity of the Hong Kong dollar.
25 As mentioned previously, it is important to note that the stock of official reserves overestimates the
actual level of reserves in Thailand. This was clearly demonstrated after the devaluation of the baht in
July 1997.20
G.   Summary
In short, as we saw in the previous section, the four post-crisis “floaters” among the five
Asian crisis countries have allowed substantially more flexibility to their nominal exchange rates
than they did before the crisis, but not as much as have the industrial-country “clean” floaters.
26
They moderated exchange rate movements triggered by foreign exchange market shocks through
foreign exchange market intervention as well as by conducting domestic monetary policy with an
eye toward external objectives.
What were they seeking to achieve in doing so? In this section we have argued that, while
they may have intended to smooth high-frequency exchange-rate fluctuations, this could not
have been the only objective guiding the behavior of the monetary authorities. In addition, their
systematic accumulation of reserves during the post-crisis period suggests that, consistent with
their long-term development strategies as well as with the short-term need to reactivate their
economies, they may have been trying to moderate the appreciation of their real effective
exchange rates after the overshooting associated with the crisis, and/or may have been engaging
in the accumulation of a reserve “war chest” to employ in the future stabilization of the exchange
rate. Note that these arguments apply both to the four “floaters,” as well as to the non-floater
case of Malaysia during the post-crisis period. Though we cannot distinguish between these
objectives on the basis of the cumulative behavior of reserves during the post-crisis period, there
is some direct evidence indicating that reserve accumulation was an independent objective of
policy.
V.   AN EVALUATION: EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND POST-CRISIS ECONOMICS
The post-crisis exchange rate policies of our five countries can thus be characterized as
containing three common features: limited flexibility, resistance of real exchange rate
appreciation, and reserve accumulation. Is a policy featuring these three components appropriate
for these economies?  In this section we will consider possible rationales for these policies in the
specific post-crisis context of the five Asian crisis countries.
A.   Limited Flexibility
It is worth emphasizing that, while the former crisis countries may have been forced to
float in the context of the crisis by their limited ability to resist the substantial pressures that
emerged against their currencies, they have had significantly more discretion about their
exchange rate policies during the post-crisis period than other floaters. Nevertheless, though they
have intervened to smooth exchange rate fluctuations, with the exception of Malaysia they have
not reintroduced predictable pegs against the U.S. dollar. Thus, what needs to be evaluated, at
least for four of these countries, is the apparent policy of limited—but nonzero—exchange rate
variability.
                                                
26 See footnotes 14 and 17.21
Permitting a greater degree of flexibility to nominal exchange rates while eschewing pre-
announced parities has two potential virtues in the post-crisis context:
•  Enhanced exchange rate flexibility presumably helps to align perceived de facto exchange
rate policy with the de jure exchange rate regime, thus preventing the emergence of an
implicit commitment to an exchange rate parity. By not committing the government to
defending a fixed parity, and therefore not compromising the government’s prestige in any
market-induced depreciation of the exchange rate, this policy reduces the incentives for the
government to commit resources to a defense of the rate, and thus reduces potential profit
opportunities in speculation against the currency. This is simply the standard argument for
the view that currency crises (in the form of sharp exchange rate movements) are less likely
to occur under floating exchange rates.
•  By explicitly creating uncertainty about the future course of the exchange rate, exchange rate
variability may discourage the assumption of additional foreign currency risk by reducing
moral hazard problems associated with the perception of implicit government exchange
guarantees.
On the other hand, as argued earlier, some degree of exchange rate smoothing may be an
appropriate response in the immediate post-crisis period from a Bayesian perspective, mainly
because under such circumstances economic agents may have weak prior beliefs about the
equilibrium level of the nominal (and real) exchange rate, thus making “extrapolative”
expectations more likely to arise. Intervention to smooth high-frequency exchange rate
movements may thus help to anchor agents’ expectations about the path of the real and nominal
exchange rates, which may be particularly pertinent in post-crisis circumstances.
27
Preserving the perception that the exchange rate is free to move requires the central bank
to abstain from targeting it. Ensuring that the exchange rate does not embark on extreme, self-
reinforcing fluctuations may require the central bank to do exactly the opposite. These objectives
are thus potentially in conflict. The behavior of the four “floaters” among our five countries can
be interpreted as an attempt to strike a balance between these objectives. As mentioned above,
eschewing an announced parity while allowing the exchange rate substantial latitude to move in
both directions avoids the perception of a de facto peg, such as existed before the crisis. Within
that framework, a policy of “leaning against the wind” may help to safeguard against
destabilizing speculation based on actual exchange rate movements without jeopardizing the
perception of exchange rate flexibility. Thus, the limited but nonzero exchange rate variability
allowed by the four “floaters” may represent an attempt to strike a compromise between
desirable but potentially conflicting objectives in the post-crisis context.
In contrast to the compromise between these two objectives apparently sought by the
other crisis countries, Malaysia opted for the benefits of stability, while completely foregoing
                                                
27 If so, as we have noted, it would justify the “smoothing” component of exchange market intervention,
but not the systematic reserve accumulation that we actually observe in the five Asian crisis countries.22
those of flexibility. If an intermediate position within the “hollow middle” was optimal for the
other countries, why was the same choice not optimal for Malaysia?
One hypothesis is that Malaysia’s choice to opt for a corner solution was driven by the
fact that, in view of the decision taken by that country in mid-1998 to attempt to recover from the
crisis by reflating outside the context of a Fund-supported adjustment program, and given the
political dimensions of that decision in that country, it may have faced a much less favorable
flexibility-stability tradeoff than other countries in the region. The decision to reflate without the
Fund would itself have unsettled the foreign exchange market, and the associated implied
replacement of Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim, the former heir-apparent to Prime Minister
Mahathir, would have compounded the effect through the political uncertainty it created. In that
context exchange market pressures would have become very severe, and may have dictated the
choice to fix the rate and impose capital controls.
In sum, it can be argued that post-crisis exchange rate policies at neither extreme of the
exchange regime spectrum may have been appropriate under post-crisis circumstances in all five
crisis countries. These policies may have helped to anchor agents’ expectations in all of them
while, at the same time, introducing some degree of uncertainty in four of them.
B.   Smoothing the pace of appreciation
As we have discussed, a byproduct of reserve accumulation is to moderate the
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate in the wake of the overshooting associated with the
crisis. The resulting relative depreciation of the real exchange rate enhances the competitiveness
of these economies, and has thus contributed to the recovery of real activity by encouraging
exports and discouraging imports. Figure 4 shows the behavior of the real effective exchange
rate in our five countries both before and after the crisis.
In each case, the real effective exchange rate was more appreciated on average during
1999–2001 than the minimum values reached in early 1998, but more depreciated than its pre-
crisis level. This pattern, in which a large part of the real exchange rate depreciation associated
with the crisis is sustained for several years after the crisis, was also characteristic of post-crisis
recoveries in Chile (after the crisis of 1982) and Mexico (after the crisis of 1994). As shown in
Table 9, in all of these cases the crisis was associated with a short and sharp contraction in real
economic activity, and the recovery in real economic activity was accompanied by a rapid
acceleration in export growth, fueled in part by improved competitiveness.
One way to interpret what these countries have done in the area of exchange rate policy,
then, is as a component of a recovery strategy for real economic activity, other components of
which have included a loosening of both fiscal and monetary policies after an initial tightening in
the immediate aftermath of the crisis intended to restore creditor confidence. Given that an
excessive loosening of fiscal and monetary policies to reactivate these economies may have
threatened a fragile restoration of confidence, relative real exchange rate depreciation may have
had an advantage as an instrument of policy that could promote recovery without undermining
confidence. Moreover, the outward orientation that characterized the development strategies of23
all of these economies—and the consequent large size of the traded goods sector—may have
made real exchange rate depreciation a relatively powerful tool in stimulating domestic
economic activity.
Figure 4: REERs in Five Asian Crisis Countries (1990 = 100)































































Table 9: Real GDP and Volume of Exports
Growth During Post-Crisis Recovery in Eight Crisis Countries (%)
Chile 1983 1984–88
Average growth in Export Volume 0.07 10.16
Average growth in Real GDP -3.49 5.74
Mexico 1995 1996–99
Average growth in Export Volume 12.1 13.0
Average growth in Real GDP -6.17 5.16
Thailand 1998 1999–00
Average growth in Export Volume 6.54 14.2
Average growth in Real GDP -10.8 4.53
Philippines 1998 1999–00
Average growth in Export Volume 4.89 11.4
Average growth in Real GDP -0.59 3.70
Malaysia 1998 1999–00
Average growth in Export Volume -3.86 14.8
Average growth in Real GDP -7.36 7.19
Korea 1998 1999–00
Average growth in Export Volume 13.3 18.6
Average growth in Real GDP -6.69 10.11
Indonesia 1998 1999–00
Average growth in Export Volume 8.88 4.19
Average growth in Real GDP -13.1 2.82
Source: IMF24
C.   Reserve Accumulation
Third, and perhaps most importantly, reserve accumulation may actually be an important
component of a natural transition to a new regime of floating exchange rates. In recent years, we
have become increasingly aware that countries that do not announce fixed exchange rate parities
tend to float very differently from each other. In particular, Hausmann and others (2000) have
noted that among floaters, some countries maintain much larger stocks of reserves than others,
and use them to intervene much more actively in the foreign exchange market, thus providing
much more stability to the nominal exchange rate than would have been observed otherwise.
They have identified two systematic influences on countries’ decisions to intervene more or less
actively, and thus to maintain larger or smaller stocks of reserves: the degree of exchange rate
“pass-through” in their economies, and the extent to which agents in these economies are able to
borrow externally in their own currencies. The inability of many developing country agents to
borrow in their own currencies was dubbed “original sin” by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
Empirically, the severity of  “original sin” proved to be the most important factor in explaining
the size of the reserve stocks maintained by floaters.
While Hausmann and others have documented an empirical regularity in the way that
countries float, McKinnon (2000) has provided an explicit argument linking “original sin” to
optimal exchange rate policy that actually goes much further. Essentially his point is that, unless
countries credibly commit to a fixed long-run value of their nominal exchange rates, expectations
of devaluation will create interest rate differentials that will make it very expensive for domestic
residents to hedge foreign exchange rate risk. Thus, if “original sin” prevails, currency
mismatches will be the rule in emerging economies that are open to capital flows. Such
mismatches will aggravate the real consequences of exchange rate crises, as they evidently have
done in the Asian countries. It is possible to add to this that such mismatches will also make
currency crises more likely to happen (see Montiel (1999)). The upshot is that in the presence of
“original sin,” countries should credibly commit themselves to permanent exchange values of
their currencies.
Whether for the purpose of managing floats or to secure a permanent long-run value for
the currency, being in the position to intervene extensively in the foreign exchange market
requires the accumulation of a sufficiently large stock of reserves by countries that are subject to
“original sin.” As it happens, the five countries that concern us are among those included in the
original study by Hausmann and others, and according to the indicators used in that paper, all of
them fit this description. Since all of them went through currency crises that featured substantial
depletion of their reserve stocks, one justification of their post-crisis exchange rate policies could
be that these policies represent a transitory period of reserve accumulation. The latter is needed
to put these countries in the position to manage their exchange rates much more actively over the
indefinite future, and thus provide the protection against currency mismatches in the presence of
“original sin” that would be expected by Hausmann and others as well as by McKinnon.
These arguments suggest that a policy of smoothing-cum-reserve accumulation may
actually have been optimal for these five Asian countries in the post-crisis period. This policy
simultaneously achieves three goals:25
•  By reducing the noise content in exchange rate movements, it makes it easier for
economic agents to extract information from exchange rate movements, and thus promotes
the efficient allocation of resources.
•  By temporarily preserving an overly depreciated real exchange rate, it promotes economic
recovery in these heavily outwardly-oriented economies.
•  By accumulating a reserve cushion, it provides the means through which these victims of
“original sin” can protect themselves in the future from the disruptive consequences of
currency mismatches.
These ex ante considerations, coupled with a very strong macroeconomic performance in
the crisis countries during the post-crisis period (not only the large reserve accumulation itself,
but also a large current account adjustment achieved with a rapid growth recovery and without
inflation) give grounds for a favorable verdict on exchange rate policies in the Asian countries
during the post-crisis period.
Moreover, from a narrower perspective that focuses on the sustainability of the exchange
rate regime itself, these policies also appear to have been successful. Because the “dirty floats” in
which these countries have engaged imply that the exchange rate has explicitly or implicitly been
a target of macroeconomic policies (that is, these countries have not been at the extreme end of
“pure floating” in the exchange regime distribution), their currencies are in principle vulnerable
to speculative attacks that would force the authorities away from their exchange-market
intervention rules. Such attacks, whether successful or not, would manifest themselves in
extreme observations of the components of the “exchange market pressure indices”—reserve
changes, interest rates, and/or exchange rate changes. Yet, as shown in Figure 5, all of these
indicators have been relatively tranquil (non-positive) in the post-crisis period, with indicators of
exchange market pressure remaining at levels either similar to or substantially below those
registered in December 1998 for all of the crisis countries.
28
These results suggest that the total policy package in these countries has been a credible
one, perceived as sustainable by the markets. In other words, although these countries have
moved along the exchange regime continuum away from the ‘fixed’ toward the ‘flexible’ end,
they have not gone all the way. Yet, up to end 2001, at least, they do not appear to have been
penalized by the markets for not having done so.
VI.   LOOKING AHEAD: SOME QUALIFICATIONS
While these considerations would seem to suggest that exchange rate policy has been
conducted in a fairly benign fashion in these countries, given their post-crisis circumstances,
these conclusions are subject to some qualifications. In particular, there is an alternative
                                                
28 Figure 5 computes the indicator of exchange market pressure using December 1998 as a benchmark.
Changes in reserves, exchange rates, and interest rates are weighted by the inverse of their volatilities
during the sample period.26
Figure 5: Post-Crisis Exchange Market Pressure in the Five Crisis Economies
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Source: Authors’ calculations
perspective that puts matters in a somewhat less favorable light, suggesting that the post-
crisisexchange rate policies pursued in the five countries we have studied constitute at best a
second-best policy response to the persistence of some important domestic distortions, the
removal of which has been the explicit objective of policy after the Asian financial crisis. Thus,
the exchange rate policies that have been pursued in these countries in effect recognize the
incomplete success of policies directed to the removal of such distortions, and can thus be
interpreted as transitory in nature. As policy succeeds in diminishing the severity of these
distortions, exchange rate policy should be modified accordingly.
This alternative perspective begins by questioning the role of nominal exchange rate
stability in avoiding the consequences of currency mismatches. The key point is that the presence
of “original sin” does not imply that currency mismatches and their consequences can be avoided
only through stabilization of the nominal exchange rate. If this link is broken, then “original sin”
cannot be used to justify the maintenance of large reserve stocks by the Asian crisis countries.
Countries tend to hold large amounts of reserves while floating in order to retain the
option of preventing large depreciations of the domestic currency. They do this, according to27
Hausmann and others (2000), precisely because the monetary authorities are aware of the
presence of severe currency mismatches in the balance sheets of domestic economic agents, and
these mismatches increase the costs—as perceived by the authorities—that are associated with
large exchange rate movements. But why do large policy-relevant mismatches arise in the first
place?  Both Hausmann and others as well as McKinnon (2000) attribute them to “original sin.”
McKinnon argues that the link between “original sin” and exchange rate stabilization operates
through the disincentives for the financial hedging of exchange rate risk created by interest rate
differentials that arise from the risk of currency devaluation. Currency mismatches arise simply
because it is too expensive to hedge exchange rate risk in such a situation. Thus, “original sin” is
linked to large policy-relevant currency mismatches, which gives rise to an optimal desire for
exchange rate stabilization on the part of the authorities, which in turn causes them to wish to
hold large amounts of reserves.
But, taking “original sin” as a given, it is not obvious that “excessive” currency
mismatches should result, for two reasons:
(a) First, many agents in open economies possess natural “real” hedges against exchange rate
risk, in the form of assets devoted to the production of traded goods. Agents whose assets
and liabilities are both effectively denominated in foreign currency are obviously not
vulnerable to exchange rate risk. For such agents, “original sin” does not give rise to
currency mismatches. The potential scope for external borrowing in foreign exchange
without incurring currency risk in a given economy depends on the size of that
economy’s traded goods sector. For relatively open economies, such as the five Asian
crisis countries, this scope is potentially quite large.
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(b) The problem is, of course, that under “original sin” foreign currency debt may be
incurred by agents that do not possess such natural hedges, giving rise to currency
mismatches. But in principle this is just one among many economic risks that markets
allocate. This source of risk, like any other, would presumably raise the cost of capital to
the agents undertaking it, and thus be efficiently allocated by the market. In the presence
of “original sin,” then, the extent of external borrowing in foreign currency by agents for
whom such borrowing would tend to create currency mismatches should be naturally
restricted by the market, leaving no argument for policy intervention in the form of
exchange rate stabilization.
Thus, both because currency mismatches may not arise and because if they do they may
not be sub-optimal, the link between “original sin” and the optimality of exchange rate
                                                
29 If the traded goods sector accounts for 30–40 percent of GDP, for example, and the capital-output ratio
is approximately 3, the entire capital stock of the traded goods sector could be financed with foreign
currency borrowing of around 90–120 percent of GDP without incurring currency mismatches, a
figure that is greater than the foreign-currency debt of all the Asian crisis countries except for
Indonesia—in 1998, Indonesia’s foreign debt was about 172 percent of GDP, while for the other four
countries this ratio fluctuated between 44 and 77 percent (source: World Debt Tables).28
stabilization may be a tenuous one, simply because “original sin” may not give rise to policy-
relevant currency mismatches.
However, this raises the issue of whether agents may not be induced to undertake
excessive currency risk in the presence of “original sin” by market distortions such as the moral
hazard problems that arise in the context of poorly capitalized and supervised financial
intermediaries, or by the expectation of bailouts among well-connected firms in the real sector.
When such distortions are important, currency mismatches can indeed become excessive, and
this suggests a second-best argument for stabilizing the exchange rate.
30 Just such a situation is
typically blamed for the severity of the financial crisis in Asia (and other crises in the past), and
indeed is probably implicit in the analyses by Hausmann et.al. and by McKinnon. It is quite
likely that it accounts for the “fear of floating” that characterized the Asian countries prior to the
crisis.
The key question, of course, concerns the relevance of this analysis for post-crisis Asia.
Much of the post-crisis restructuring of these economies has been designed precisely to reduce
the incidence of such moral hazard problems by improving the regulatory and supervisory
framework for the financial sector, capitalizing banks, and addressing problems of corporate
governance. To the extent that this process is incomplete, and that incentives remain in place for
domestic agents to take on excessive currency risk, then the reserve accumulation objective for
future exchange rate stabilization purposes would appear to be justified, but only as a transitory,
second-best policy response to the persistence of domestic distortions. Since holding foreign
exchange reserves is a costly activity, as these problems are addressed and resolved, the
maintenance of large stocks of foreign reserves by Asian central banks would no longer be
justified on the basis of “original sin.”
Has reserve accumulation already proceeded beyond the optimal point, given the
circumstances of these economies? Unfortunately, this is a question on which we can shed little
light. The reason is that, in the presence of currency mismatches, the level of reserves required to
protect a country against a successful speculative attack in theory depends on a variety of
characteristics of the economy, so no simple benchmark that ignores such country-specific
characteristics would be appropriate to judge the adequacy of reserve levels.
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VII.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The basic questions we have addressed in this paper are: what exchange rate policies
have the Asian crisis countries pursued in the post-crisis period, why have they done so, and how
                                                
30 Some observers have argued that stabilizing the exchange rate may itself create excessive currency
mismatches, but it is hard to see why this should occur in the absence of the distortions discussed
previously—i.e., stabilizing the exchange rate should not increase external borrowing unless agents
believe (ex-ante) that associated with it there is a greater chance of a bail-out.
31 These characteristics include the extent of currency mismatches, the amount of economic damage that
their presence can do in the event of a sharp depreciation, the economy’s current account deficit, and
its stock of short-term external obligations. See Montiel (1999).29
do we evaluate these policies? Moreover, we would like to use the post-crisis experience of these
countries do draw lessons about exchange rate policies under conditions of high financial
integration in other countries.
In summarizing our results, it is useful to begin with a rather obvious observation: the
simple classification of exchange rate regimes into “hard pegs,” “soft pegs,” and “floating” is a
fiction. In practice, exchange rate regimes operate along a continuum. The crisis simply caused
the Asian crisis countries to move along this continuum. But this move has not been uniform
within the region:
(a) Malaysia moved in the direction of much greater fixity and less integration with world
capital markets.
(b) Korea and Thailand appear to have entered a post-crisis (i.e., tranquil) period in 1999–
2001. During this period, they have maintained or increased their degree of integration
with world capital markets and moved in the direction of greater flexibility, but not to the
extreme pole of clean floating (especially Thailand).
(c) Because of domestic political uncertainties, it is not so clear that the Philippines and
Indonesia truly moved into a post-crisis period during 1999–2001. Relative to the pre-
crisis period, both countries have altered their exchange rate regimes in the direction of
greater flexibility, however.
While all of these countries have moved along the exchange rate regime continuum, none
of them have opted to jump to either of its extreme poles. If we define the intermediate range of
exchange rate regimes as consisting of those in which exchange rates continue to be actively
managed, with or without explicit numerical exchange rate targets, these countries are squarely
within that range. In that sense, their post-crisis experience suggests that the “middle” has not
become as hollow as is sometimes claimed.
How well have these modifications in their exchange rate regimes served the Asian crisis
countries?  The most plausible interpretation of the objectives of exchange rate policy in these
countries is that they were designed to achieve three objectives: to stabilize high-frequency
exchange rate movements, to slow the pace of real appreciation after the overshooting associated
with the crisis, and to accumulate a “war chest” of liquid foreign exchange reserves. We have
argued that all of these were reasonable objectives of policy in the post-crisis context.
Moreover, these post-crisis regimes have been successful both from the narrow
perspective that they have apparently been judged sustainable by the markets (i.e., they have not
been subjected to extreme episodes of “exchange market pressure”) and from the broader
perspective that, especially in countries that have avoided political instability, they have been
associated with very successful macroeconomic performance, both in terms of real activity as
well as of the economies’ external accounts. Growth has picked up rapidly, inflation has
remained low, and current accounts have adjusted rapidly.
Is there a link between the exchange rate practices adopted and these measures of
performance? On this we have offered little evidence. We can speculate that the removal of the30
“one-way bet” in the foreign exchange market, together with the crisis-induced real exchange
rate overshooting, may have made a difference in preventing the emergence of exchange market
pressures, and that the depreciated real exchange rate together with the accumulation of large
stocks of reserves, may have respectively supported aggregate demand and enhanced confidence.
But there is also a darker side to exchange rate policies in these countries. In particular,
reserve accumulation may have been a substitute for other measures that need to be undertaken
in these economies, such as the complete elimination of implicit guarantees and expected
government bailouts, or moral hazard behavior resulting from the existence of undercapitalized
banks, etc. To the extent that these measures have been absent and/or remain incomplete, reserve
accumulation is best interpreted as a second-best transition strategy, and the authorities may
actually have had little discretion over its adoption. Given the incompleteness of such measures,
however, the chosen exchange rate policy is an  appropriate one. Nonetheless, from this
perspective, the chosen exchange rate policy represents a symptom of something that is wrong or
unfinished, rather than a component of an optimal policy package. Once these other components
of reform have been completed in the crisis countries, continuation of the chosen exchange rate
policy may prove to be sub-optimal, since a policy of floating with a large reserve “war chest”
would be a wasteful use of scarce national resources.
Finally, what lessons can be drawn for other countries? One tentative lesson is that, along
the continuum of exchange rate regimes, the portion of the “middle” that is actually “hollow” is
probably small. What enhanced financial integration has undoubtedly done is to have made it far
more difficult for financially integrated countries to sustain “soft” pegs, simply because capital
markets will not allow domestic policy mistakes to go unpunished. But whether there is literally
no scope for such regimes depends on whether the domestic authorities can avoid vulnerability
through their policy choices. In other words, the part of the “middle” that may be “hollow” is the
maintenance of explicit or implicit “soft” pegs with unfettered capital movements and potentially
skeptical capital markets.  That is the lesson of pre-crisis Asia, where policy mistakes were not
avoided and “soft” pegs fell apart through the reactions of unfettered capital markets. It may also
be the lesson of post-crisis Malaysia, where the adoption of an exchange rate peg, together with
policies viewed by markets in an unfavorable light, were perceived to require the imposition of
barriers to capital movements.
The lesson that emerges from the experiences of the other post-crisis Asian countries
seems to be that there remain other choices away from the extremes of the exchange rate regime
spectrum, and that active management of the exchange rate not only remains feasible under
current international conditions, but may actually be desirable depending on country
circumstances.  Specifically, under post-crisis conditions, if the fragility of domestic balance
sheets rules out “hard” pegs as an option (because of the strains imposed by periods of high
interest rates that may be needed to defend the peg), a “dirty” float designed to resist real
appreciation and accumulate reserves has much to recommend it over the polar extreme of
“clean” floating.31
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Asian Crisis Countries in McKinnon
As indicated in the text, McKinnon (2000) has drawn the conclusion that, with the
exception of Indonesia, the Asian crisis countries have essentially reverted to a dollar
standard in the post-crisis period. McKinnon bases his interpretation of exchange rate policy
in these countries on regressions of the form:
(∆% Local currency/SWF)t = β1 + β 2 (∆% US$/SWF)t + β 3 (∆% JP¥/SWF)t (A.1)
                                              + β 4 (∆% DM/SWF)t + εt
where SWF denotes the Swiss franc, JP¥ the Japanese yen, and DM the German mark.
He emphasizes the coefficient and standard error of the dollar/swf rate, finding it to be close
to unity with  a small standard error both before and after the crisis for Korea, the
Philippines, and Thailand, and concludes that this suggests that these currencies have
effectively been re-pegged against the U.S. dollar.
It is true that this coefficient would be close to unity, its standard error would be
small, and the equation would have very large explanatory power if the currency in question
were tied to the dollar through a fixed-rate arrangement. Thus, if one knows that a currency
is fixed to a basket, but does not know the composition of the basket, this equation can be
used to estimate the composition of the basket from observed exchange rate movements.
But it is not true that if the coefficient is close to unity and its standard error small,
this implies the existence of a fixed-rate basket arrangement. The same result could emerge
under a floating exchange rate regime. The correlation between the bilateral exchange rate
of the domestic currency and that of the U.S. dollar against a third currency depends on the
extent to which the domestic currency and the U.S. dollar experience similar shocks. The
prevalence over the sample period of symmetric shocks affecting the domestic economy and
the United States, or the presence of strong channels of transmission for economic shocks
(‘contagion’) from the U.S. to the domestic economy would tend to magnify the size of this
correlation. Thus, the magnitude of the coefficient of the bilateral exchange rate of the U.S.
dollar against a third currency in the regression above and the precision with which its is
estimated would tend to depend on the strength of economic links between the economy in
question and the United States.
The explanatory power of the regression under flexible exchange rates, on the other
hand, would depend on the incidence of asymmetric shocks (shocks that only affect the
domestic economy, but are not transmitted back to the United States). The stronger such
shocks, the smaller the explanatory power of the regression. Thus, McKinnon’s results are
consistent either with a tight peg against the U.S. dollar (his preferred interpretation) or with
a much looser currency link to the dollar combined with tight economic links to the dollar
area and a relative absence of independent shocks during the sample period. Based on the
evidence in the main text, we prefer the latter interpretation.33
To support our view, we have conducted similar exercises for Switzerland and
Chile. In the former case, the Swiss franc has long been considered one of the “pure
floaters,” while in the latter case there was an explicit change in the foreign exchange
regime in the direction of a much greater floating. Running regressions similar to (A.1) we
derived the following results:
Table A.1 Switzerland
1.- Pre-crisis period
Dependent Variable: SF Sample: 1995:07 1997:06
Method: Least Squares Included observations: 24
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.001410 0.002812 -0.501312 0.6214
DM 1.190645 0.121715 9.782260 0.0000
YEN -0.005156 0.083750 -0.061559 0.9515
R-squared 0.860328     Mean dependent var 0.010416
Adjusted R-squared 0.847025     S.D. dependent var 0.032141
S.E. of regression 0.012571     Akaike info criterion -5.798396
Sum squared resid 0.003319     Schwarz criterion -5.651139
Log likelihood 72.58075     F-statistic 64.67588
Durbin-Watson stat 1.280502     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Note: the results remain qualitatively identical after correcting for first order autocorrelation.
2. Post-crisis period
Dependent Variable: SF Sample: 1999:02 2001:01
Method: Least Squares Included observations: 24
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.001910 0.001579 -1.209224 0.2400
EURO 0.959883 0.054514 17.60795 0.0000
YEN -0.037723 0.057977 -0.650653 0.5223
R-squared 0.936590     Mean dependent var 0.006599
Adjusted R-squared 0.930551     S.D. dependent var 0.027951
S.E. of regression 0.007366     Akaike info criterion -6.867411
Sum squared resid 0.001139     Schwarz criterion -6.720154
Log likelihood 85.40893     F-statistic 155.0901
Durbin-Watson stat 2.309603     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Note that the coefficient on the DM/Euro was close to unity and significant in both periods,
and that the regression appears to possess a high degree of explanatory power. This
regression would appear to have the (counterfactual) implication that the Swiss franc was
tied to the DM/Euro in both periods. Similarly, turning to the results of a specification for




Dependent Variable: PESO Sample: 1995:07 1997:06
Method: Least Squares Included observations: 24
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.003294 0.002795 1.178842 0.2523
DOLLAR 0.976946 0.116533 8.383407 0.0000
DM -0.313771 0.289633 -1.083337 0.2915
YEN 0.294248 0.083813 3.510784 0.0022
R-squared 0.894775     Mean dependent var -0.004814
Adjusted R-squared 0.878991     S.D. dependent var 0.035867
S.E. of regression 0.012477     Akaike info criterion -5.778866
Sum squared resid 0.003113     Schwarz criterion -5.582523
Log likelihood 73.34639     F-statistic 56.68954
Durbin-Watson stat 2.002477     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
2. Post-crisis period
Dependent Variable: PESO Sample(adjusted): 1999:02 2001:01
Method: Least Squares Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.009520 0.007891 1.206464 0.2417
DOLLAR 1.091868 0.384462 2.839987 0.0101
EURO -0.757272 1.051387 -0.720259 0.4797
YEN 0.047385 0.284342 0.166647 0.8693
R-squared 0.480469     Mean dependent var 0.001194
Adjusted R-squared 0.402540     S.D. dependent var 0.046370
S.E. of regression 0.035842     Akaike info criterion -3.668385
Sum squared resid 0.025693     Schwarz criterion -3.472043
Log likelihood 48.02062     F-statistic 6.165432
Durbin-Watson stat 2.410064     Prob(F-statistic) 0.003847
Chile has explicitly moved—in the absence of a crisis—toward a greater degree of exchange
rate flexibility in the second of the two sample periods reported above. Yet the regression
reveals an increase in the coefficient on the U.S. dollar during the second period. We conclude
from these results that regressions of this type provide an unreliable indicator of exchange rate
policies.